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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WILL J. McGOWAN,

Appellant,

vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Respondent.

Case No.
7683

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Basing his complaint upon the Safety Appliance Act
(45 U. S. C. A., Section 2 et seq.) respondent brought this
action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to
have been sustained as a result of the use by the appellant
in interstate commerce of a car "not equipped with coupler
mechanism which would couple automatically on impact"
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(R. 1-4). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $13,000.00 (R. 25-A). The court granted a new trial conditioned upon the plaintiff's refusal to
remit $6000.00 from the judgment. He accepted the reduced
amount and a new trial was denied (R. 28).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured while the crew of
which he was a member was switching cars. in the defendant's railroad yard at Cameo, Colorado (R. 35). The movement in the course of which the plaintiff was injured involved the coupling of a Grand Trunk Western Railroad
car and a Rio Grande car, No. 70523 (R. 36). The Grand
Trunk Western car was a boxcar and was stationary. The
Rio Grande car was a coal car and was attached directly to
the engine (R. 36). Plaintiff was directing the coupling
movement from a position on the ground about eight feet
away from the end of the boxcar (R. 38-9). As the coal
car reached a point opposite him he inserted his foot between
the cars and against the dra wbar of the coal car ( R. 40).
When the coupling devices of the two cars came in contact
plaintiff's foot was. between them, and he suffered the loss
of part of the big toe of his right foot (R. 41-5). The cars
coupled upon impact notwithstanding the presence of portions of plaintiff's foot was inside the knuckles. (R. 41).
Plaintiff testified that the coal car was. moving at a
speed of about four miles an hour when it reached a point
about eight feet from the boxcar and that he then noticed
that the drawbar appeared to be "out of line" (R. 40). He
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says he pushed on the drawbar three times but he was unable to determine the extent of movement of the drawbar,
if any, accomplished by his pushing on it with his foot (R.
65-6). He was, however, still pushing on the drawbar when
the cars came together ( R. 68) .
The cars were about eight feet apart when the plaintiff made the first push on the drawbar with his foot (R.
64).
He testified that while the coal car was moving this
distance at a rate of speed of about four miles an hour,
he not only pushed on the drawbar three times with his
foot but found time to step out from between the cars in
the interval between the first and second push and signal
the engineer to stop (R. 67). He says that this signal was
given when the cars were about four feet apart and that the
engineer ignored the signal (R. 67).
The engineer testified for the defendant that he observed the plaintiff standing near the point where the
coupling was later made and that when the two cars were
about one foot apart the plaintiff went between the cars
(R. 95-7). He recognized the plaintiff's danger and immediately attempted to stop the train but was unable to do
so (R. 95-7). He observed the plaintiff during the entire
course of the movement and testified positively that at no
time did the plaintiff give any stop signal (R. 97).
The coal car was barely moving at the time of impact
and the coupling was made with only a minimum of jarring.
Mr. Kuykendall, the conductor, remained at the scene
of the accident until the arrival of three safety inspectors,
employees of the defendant (R. 101). These inspectors care-
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fully examined the coupling devices of both cars and made
several tests in which the cars on every occasion coupled
automatically upon impact. McCoy, one of the inspectors,
testified that there was no defect of any kind in any of the
coupling mechanism of either car and that they functioned
perfectly.
Mr. McCoy als.o te·stified that the coal car drawbar
against which plaintiff had pushed was of modern type,
built on a rocker mechanism so that it would automatically
rock or gravitate to a centered position (R. 107). This
rocker is called a swinging type carrier arm, and its purpose
is to keep the drawbar centered within a minimum l·ateral
play of not more than one inch each way (R. 107). The
lateral movement could be increased to two inches each
way by exerting extra pressure, so that the carrier arm
would "ride up." This extra pressure was demonstrated by
two men pushing against the drawbar. One man could not
push the drawbar beyond the one inch free play allowed by
the rocker. As soon as the e·xtra pressure was released the
drawbar would rock back within the centered area (R. 108).
The witness also testified that the rocker mechanism
was in good mechanical condition, and that there were no
defects which would prevent it from rocking back within the
one inch play permitted by the special type rocker arm (R.
108, 109, 112, 113 and 115).
The defendant had prepared for the jury a portable
mechanism upon which were· mounted two drawbars and
couplers of the exact type, measurement, and make of the
couplers involved in the accident. These couplers were so
constructed that they could be operated and pushed together in the presence of the jury (Ex. 5) .
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The witness Martin, who is the General Car Fore·man
of the Grand Junction Division, testified that he supe·rvised
the construction of the exhibit and that it was in all respects identical to the equipment involved (Ro 115-120).
After qualifying as an expert witness he explained to the
jury why the drawbars must be engineered so that they can
move laterally This movement is necessary so that the
cars can negotiate curves and accommodate the swaying
motion incident to ordinary travel along the tracks (Ro 121).
If at least a two-inch movement each way is not allowed, a
car as long as the coal car (fifty feet and two inches.) will
derail on curves. For this reason the coal car was equipped
with a drawbar which would, under extra pressure, move
two inches each way, and when the pressure was released,
gravitate back to a centered position (R. 121-122) o
0

Mr Martin further testified that he had never seen
any railroad car on the D & R. G. system, or on the system
of any other railroad, that had a mechanism on the side of
the car from which an operator could center a drawbar,
and that on occasions men go between the cars. for the purpose of making a preliminary alignment of a drawbaro He
stated, however, that this preliminary action takes place
when the cars are stopped (R. 124-125-126).
0

0

The only injury sustained by the plaintiff was the
crushing of the big toe, necessitating amputation at the
first joint (R. 45) He was off work from April 16th to the
latter part of September. He resumed his regular employment as a brakeman in September and was so employed at
the time of the trial (R. 47).
0
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON

I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE COUPLERS DID
NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
STATUTE.

II.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 3 AND 4.

III.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 5 AND 7.

IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THAT THE
PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE SAFETY AND
OPERATION RULES OF THE COMPANY AND
THAT ON THE DAY BEFORE PLAINTIFF'S
INJURY, PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SAID
RULES AND HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY
WARNED TO DESIST FROM SUCH PRACTICE.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE COUPLERS DID
NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
STATUTE.
The controlling provision of the Safety Appliance Act
reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any common carrier
engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to haul
or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car
used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with
couplers coupling automatically on impact and which
can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going
between the ends of the cars."

We do not contend that the trial court erred in refusing
to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because of the absence of any evidence of a mechanical defect
in the coupling devices or because of a failure of proof of
negligence on the part of the defendant in maintaining the
couplers in a state of good repair. What we do contend is
that there is no evidence which tends to prove that the cars
in question were not equipped with couplers that would
couple automatically on impact or that there was any insufficiency in the coupling equipment that made it necessary for the plaintiff to go between the cars to effect the
coupling on the occasion in which he was injured.
To effect a coupling of two railroad cars by any devices so far invented, it is necessary that the drawbars
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of the couplers be in alignment sufficient to allow the
jaws or knuckles of the couplers to mesh. The coupled
cars cannot be operated in any ordinary railroad movement
if the drawbars are rigidly fastened to the cars. There
must be some lateral play in the drawbars or the cars will
derail upon reaching a curve in the railroad tracks. The
amount of lateral play required to prevent derailment of
the car depends upon the size and length of the car. No
court, so far as we know, has ever intimated that a drawbar having only a reasonably required lateral play does
not meet the full requirements of the statute.
There is no evidence whatsoever to the effect that the
drawbar on either of the cars involved in the coupling
movement had any more lateral play than was necessary to
successfully operate the cars.
As to the amount of lateral play in the drawbar of
the standing box car the only testimony was that this type
of car had a maximum lateral play of 2lj2 inches. However,
the plaintiff testified that he observed the drawbar on
this car and that it was in a centered position. This testimony was not disputed. The plaintiff in his complaint
makes no claim that the drawbar on this car was out of
alignment. In any event the coupling was made without
anything being done to this drawbar in the way of aligning.
With respect to the lateral play in the drawbar of the
moving coal car, the undisputed testimony was that in
order to operate the car on the defendant's tracks, the
drawbar had to have a lateral play of two inches on each
side. The evidence is further undisputed that this drawbar
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had a lateral play of only two inches on each side. Mr.
Martin measured the lateral play and testified without
contradiction that it was not in excess of the amount required to keep the car from derailing.
The evidence being uncontradicted that neither drawbar had any more lateral play than required to operate
the cars successfully and that the drawbar on the standing
car :was in a centered position, there remains for consideration the position of the drawbar on the moving coal car.
Assuming solely for purpose of argument that a drawbar having a maximum lateral play of two inches on each
side may, on some occasion, require alignment in order to
effect a coupling and that the statute requires that such
a car be equipped with a mechanism that will align the
drawbar without the necessity of a man going between the
cars to operate the mechanism, there is in this case no evidence of any failure on the part of the defendant to comply
with the statute as so interpreted.
The only claim made by the plaintiff of any defect or
insufficiency in the coupling mechanism of the two cars
was that the Rio Grande car's drawbar was out of alignment and had no device whereby it could be aligned except
by pushing on the drawbar with the hands or feet. Therefore the precise question to be determined is whether there
is any evidence to sustain any such claimed defect or insufficiency.
It is undisputed that the drawbar on this car was
equipped with a rocker or swinging carrier arm device.
This rocker device was designed to automatically rock or
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gravitate the drawbar to a centered position. It was made
to perform that function without the necessity of any
manual operation or manipulation. By the exertion of a
great deal of pressure it was possible to push the drawbar
off center a maximum of two inches each way. The moment this lateral pressure was released, the drawbar would
be swung back by the rocker to a centered position. It is
possible that the drawbar could have a lateral play of as
much as one inch after the pressure was released but there
is nothing to indicate that a drawbar having only that much
lateral play would move off center sufficient to prevent
the knuckles from meshing upon impact.
There is no evidence that the rocker device failed to
perform the function for which it was designed.
We are aware that plaintiff testified that he observed
that the drawbar on the moving car was "out of line". However, he made this observation while the car was moving
about four miles per hour and when the front of the drawbar had reached a point eight feet from the point of coupling. He says that he pushed on the drawbar with his foot
three times. He was unable to state how much, if any, he
succeeded in moving the drawbar. It is extremely significant that he was still pushing on the drawbar at the very
moment the coupling occurred.
We submit that this testimony is wholly insufficient to
prove any defect or insufficiency in the rocker device or
that it failed in any respect in its function of automatically
aligning the drawbar to a position where the cars would
couple upon impact. The plaintiff's testimony that the drawbar was out of line to the extent that the two cars would
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not couple upon impact was a mere opinion, which the
subsequent event demonstrated was in error. He could not
say to what extent, if any, his pushing on the drawbar
caused it to move one way or another. His testimony is entirely speculation. He speculated that the drawbar was out
of alignment at the very instant that the coupling occurred
because he was then still pushing it with his foot. He was
most certainly wrong at that instant. He was also wrong
the first time he pushed.
In the case of Kansas City M. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Wood,
262 S. W. 520, the very same kind of evidence was offered
to show that a drawbar was out of alignment and was
rejected as mere speculation in view of the fact that the
cars actually coupled just as they did in the case at bar.
The appellate court of Texas said:
"There is no proof other than this of any defects whatever in the couplers in question, mechanically or otherwise, and nothing to support plaintiff's
contention save his own observations and opinion
as to what would have happened had he not gone
between the cars. This, we think, is leaving the
domain of fact and invading the realm of fancy, and
is too meager to sustain a recovery against appellant. The burden was upon the plaintiff to show
some defect that would constitute a failure to comply with the Federal 8afety Appliance Act. The
fact that Wood went between the cars and was hurt
imposes no burden upon appellant unless it was
negligent or failed to comply with law. And, as said
in Ry. Co. v. Bonds (Tex. Giv. App.), 244 S. W.

1102:
" 'It would be manifestly unfair to hold
that the carrier had violated the statute until
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the inefficiency of the device had been disclosed
by some reasonable test that would justify the
conclusion that it was defective.'
158

"See also, Morris v. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App;),
105·5."

s. w.

The decision of the Texas appellate court is unanswerable. The statute which we are considering requires the
railroad to provide a certain type of equipment. The equipment specified is that which will accomplish a designated
function and which can be manipulated without a man going
between the cars. It would be manifestly unwarranted, to
hold that a finding of insufficiency in the coupling equipment could be based upon a mere guess of an injured employee.

It is submitted that a failure to comply with Section
2 of the Safety Appliance Act can be established only by
proof of some mechanical defect or by failure of the coupling mechanism to function upon a fair test. Such proof
is certainly required in an action based upon the provisions
of the Safety Appliance Act requiring the carrier to equip
its cars with an efficient hand brake. To this effect see
King v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co·., ... Utah
... , 211 P. (2d) 833, from which we quote as follows:
"In the recent case of Myers v. Reading Co., 331
U. S. 477, 67 S. Ct. 1334, 91 L. Ed. 1615, the U. S.
Supreme Court announced the rule as to the methods of showing that a hand brake is 'inefficient'
within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act.
The court quoted with approval from Didinger v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 Cir., 39 F. 2d 798, 799, as
follows:
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" 'There are two recognized methods of
showing the inefficiency of hand brake equipment. Evidence may be adduced to establish
some particular defect, or the same inefficiency
may be established by showing a failure to
function, when operated with due care, in the
normal, natural, and usual manner.'"
No logical reason can be assigned for refusing to adopt
the same method for determining whether the carrier has
complied with the section specifying the type of couplers
which must be furnished.
There was, as has been pointed out, no evidence whatever of any mechanical defect in the coupling device on
either car. There was likewise no evidence whatever of any
failure of the couplers to function when subjected to a fair
test. On the contrary they functioned perfectly on the
occasion in question and thereafter when repeatedly tested.
The plaintiff's testimony that he thought the drawbar was
out of line has no probative value whatever. The controlling
inquiry is whether the equipment was sufficient or insufficient-not what the plaintiff thought about it. Nothing
short of a fair test could establish its insufficiency. Such
a test was given and conclusively demonstrated the sufficiency of the entire coupling mechanism.

It is extremely difficult to read the plaintiff's version
of how the accident occurred and escape the conviction
that the plaintiff was between the cars attempting to adjust
the knuckles and not to align the drawbar. Of course he
testified that the knuckles were open but that is contrary
to the admitted fact that his foot was inside the knuckle
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and that he was pushing against the knuckle at the instant
of impact. His description of hopping along on one foot
to align the drawbar is fantastic. His statement that he
signalled the engineer to stop was flatly contradicted. His
story that he was aligning the drawbar is demonstrated by
the facts and circumstances of the accident to be a fiction.
In any event, there was no evidence that the rocker mechanism had failed to align the drawbar sufficiently to effect
a coupling upon impact, and the court erred in denying the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

II.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 3 AND 4.
Instruction No. 3 re·ads. in part as follows:
"If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion when plaintiff was injured the couplers on the two cars would not have
coupled automatically upon impact without the
necessity of plaintiff going between the cars, then
the defendant is guilty of a violation of the Safety
Appliance Act, and if such violation proximately
caused, in whole or in part, injuries to plaintiff,
then you should return a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant and award to
plaintiff damages as in these instructions set forth."

The fundamental vice in this instruction is that it
makes the liability of the defendant turn upon a theoretical
function and the conduct of the plaintiff.
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The statute, however, deals solely with mechanical
equipment. The reference in the statute to function and to
human conduct is merely descriptive of the type of equipment required and the place where the equipment is to be
attached to the cars. It is error to assert that this statute
requires coupling devices that will operate without manipulation by human hands. The limit of the requirement of the
statute is that those parts of the coupling equipment that
require manpower to operate shall be so attached to the
cars so as to permit operation from a position outside the
cars. It is true, of course, that the statute requires the
mechanism to perform a certain function but it does not
require that the equipment shall perform this. function without the intervention of any human manipulation. No coupling device has been invented which will function automatically unles.s the knuckles are properly set. Yet it is
universally held that the carrier meets the requirement of
the statute when the cars are equipped with levers attached
to the outside of the car by means of which the employee
can open the knuckles. The most recent announcement of
this proposition was made by the Supreme Court of the
United States in A!folder v. New York, Chicago and St.
Louis R. R. Co., 339 U. S. 96, 94 L. Ed. 683, 70 S. Ct. 509.
We quote: "Of course this assumes that the coupler
was placed in a position to operate on impact. Thus if the
failure of these two cars to couple on impact was because
the coupler on the Pennsylvania car had not been properly
opened the railroad had a good defense" and from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, "The court of appeals thought the charge as a whole very probably gave the
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jury the impression that it need only find that two cars
failed to couple on impact to establish a violation of the
Safety Appliance Act. This as the court recognizes is not
the law. Before a failure to couple establishes a defective
coupler it must be found that it was properly set so it could
couple. If it was not adjusted, as such automatic couplers
must be, of course the failure is not that of the device."
Also see:

Western & Atlantic· R. R. v. Gentle, 198 S. E.
257, 58 Ga. App. 282. Certiorari denied
59 S. Ct. 252, 305 U. S. 654, 83 L. Ed. 424.
Soutkern Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 119 Fed. (2d)
85. Reversed on other grounds 62 S. Ct.
616, 315 u. s. 283.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Charlton, 247 Fed.
34, 159 C. C. A. 252.
The error pointed out in Instruction No. 3 was emphasized in that portion of Instruction No. 4 which reads:
"You are further instructed that it was the duty of the defendant company to require on the two cars in question
couplers that would couple automatically upon impact without the necessity of plaintiff going between the cars." Although this instruction does faintly recognize that the statute deals with machinery and not conduct (a virtue which
Instruction 3 does not posess) still it requires the carrier to
furnish a type of equipment which has not yet and never
will be invented.
It requires the carrier to equip its cars with a mechanism that will function without any manual effort being
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applied to it. Such a device is unknown. Surely the statute
was not intended to require a carrier to perform an impossibility. The requirement of the statute that the equipment shall perform a certain function does not mean that it
must function without any intervention of manpower. Such
however is the type of equipment that Instruction No. 4
required the defendant to furnish. The instruction therefore repeated and emphasized the vice contained in Instruction No.3.
These two instructions deal directly with the statute
upon which liability is solely predicated. Since they embody a radical misconception and erroneous interpretation
of the statute, the errors were seriously prejudicial and prevented the defendant from having a fair trial.
III.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 5 AND 7.
Instruction No. 5 reads:
"You are instructed that the phrase 'without the
necessity of going between the cars' means that in
order to effect an automatic coupling it was necessary ~or a workman to place some part of his body
within the area between the cars.
"In this connection you are instructed that if,
in order to effect an automatic coupling by impact,
it was necessary for plaintiff to adjust the drawbar or coupling mechanism with his hands or feet,
then there would be a violation of the Safety Ap-
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pliance Act by the defendant in not having the type
of coupler required by the Act.
"You are further instructed that it would make
no difference whether the car was moving or standing still."
The definition in the first paragraph above of the
phrase "without the necesHity of going between the cars" is
confusing, misleading to the jury and entirely erroneous. To
begin with, there is no such phrase in the Safety Appliance
Act. The similar phrase of the statute is "without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars." It is obvious
from a mere cursory reading of the statute that the phrase
"without the necessity of men going between the ends of the
cars" is no more than a description of the design of the coupling equipment to be placed on the cars. It is a specification
for the location of certain parts of the coupling mechanism.
It is a direction that the parts of the coupling mechanism that
are to be manipulated by manpower are to be located on the
outside of the car. If any authority were needed to demonstrate that such is the intent and meaning of this phrase, it
can be found in the Affolder case cited above.
The second paragraph of Instruction No. 5 applies this
misconception of the statute and repeats and emphasizes the
error in Instructions. Nos.. 3 and 5. It makes the liability of
the defendant turn upon the lack of necessity of the plaintiff
to do certain things. The statute, however, makes the liability of the defendant depend upon the type and condition of
the coupling mechanism on its cars.
The instruction was actually a peremptory direction to
return a verdiot for the pl·aintiff because admittedly it was
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necessary for the plaintiff to adjust the knuckles with his
hands if they were closed. The knuckles are, of course, a
part of the coupling mechanism. To tell the jury that it
would be a violation of the Safety Appliance Act if it was
necessary in order to effect an automatic coupling by impact
for the plaintiff to adjust the coupling mechanism with his
hands left the jury no alternative except to return a verdict
for the plaintiff. It is impossible for a carrier to equip its
cars with a self-operating mechanism that will open
knuckles, and the statute does not require such a mechanism. It is satisfied by a mechanism attached to the outside
of the car, notwithstanding the mechanism can be operated
only by manpower. Since the instruction involved a completely erroneous interpretation of the statute and directed
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, there is no occasion to
consider further the prejudicial character of the error.
The last paragraph of the instruction is sui generis.
We are utterly unable to see wherein the paragraph has, any
bearing upon the Safety Appliance Act or any of the issues
in this case. The only possible function it could serve would
be to perplex and confuse the jury. An equally enlightening
and helpful instruction would be to tell the jury that it
makes no difference whether the car was black or white.
We need not determine whether the last paragraph of
the instruction is so meaningless as to render the error in
it harmless because the error in the remaining part of the
instruction is so patent and fundamental that no reasonable mind could, in our opinion, regard it as harmless.
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In Instruction No.7 the court instructed the jury that:
"The Safety Appliance Act applicable to this
case requires. that a common carrier shall equip cars
used by it in interstate commerce with couplers which
will couple automatically by impact without the
necessity of men going between the cars and the fact
that some lateral motion in the coupler mechanism
is necessary in the operation of defendant's trains
does not relieve the defendant from the requirements
of said Act."
We submit that this instruction is a further repetition
of errors in other instructions. considered above and is
peculiarly misleading and confusing. It misconstrues the
intent and meaning of the statute and then proceeds to direct
the jury to give ,consideration to a wholly irrelevant and
immaterial matter. It tells them that the fact that there
must be some lateral motion in the coupling mechanism does
not relieve the defendant from the requirements of the Act.
The inevitable effect of s.o instructing the jury is to create
in their minds a conviction that a mechanism having some
lateral play does not meet the requirements of the statute.
Of course the necessity of lateral play in the drawbar
does not relieve the carrier from its duty of complying with
the Act. Neither does the necessity of having knuckles
that open and close relieve the carrier of such duty. Nothing
relieves the carrier of its. duty because the duty is absolute.
It would therefore have been entirely proper for the court
to have instructed the jury as requested by the defendant
that the exis.tence of the normal amount of lateral play was
not evidence of a violation of the Act. But to tell the jury
that the necessity of lateral motion in the coupler does not
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relieve the defendant from the requirements of the Act
is equivalent to telling them that lateral play is evidence of a
violation. The instruction is utterly indefensible and highly
prejudicial to the defendant's case.

See:

Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Corp. v. Arrington, 101
S. E. 415 (Va.).

IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THAT THE
PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE SAFETY AND
OPERATION RULES OF THE COMPANY AND
THAT ON THE DAY BEFORE PLAINTIFF'S
INJURY, PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SAID
RULES AND HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY
WARNED TO DESIST FROM SUCH PRACTICE.
The court, during the trial and in the presence· of the
jury, refused to let defendant cross-examine the plaintiff
on his alleged violations of the safety and: operating rules
of the defendant company. During the noon recess on the
day of the trial, this matter was argued informally to the
court and the court sustained the plaintiff's objections to
such proffered testimony. Thereafter, the defendant was
permitted to m·ake its proffer of the evidence excluded,
which proffer was made on the cross-examination of the
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plaintiff and in the absence of the jury. During this crossexamination the plaintiff admitted that the safety rules of
the operative department of The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, and particularly Rule 101, Rule
102 and Rule 107, were violated by him at the time of his
injury and that he knew that said rules were in effect at the
time of the violation. These rules are set out in defendant's
proposed Exhibit 2. The rule specifically prohibits an employee from going between moving cars or from using hands
or feet to adjust drawbars, knuckles or lockpins while the
cars are in motion (R. 76, 77 and 78).
The plaintiff also admitted that he was familiar with
the operating rules and regulations of the railroad, particularly Rule 811 of defendant's proposed Exhibit 3. This
rule likewise prohibits employees from going between cars
in motion or in attempting to couple cars while they are in
motion ( R. 79). Also, during the course of the cross-examination which was conducted in the absence of the jury, the
defendant denied that on April 14, 1950, the day before the
accident in which he was. injured, he had violated the foregoing rules by pushing on a drawbar with his. foot while the
cars were in motion and that on that occasion the conductor
of the crew had warned him against this practice.
The conductor of the crew was called to testify relative
to this incident. His testimony likewise was taken in the
absence of a jury. He said that on the 14th day of April, the
day before plaintiff's injuries, while he and the plaintiff
were engaged in switching operations in the yard at Funston, Colorado, that the plaintiff kicked on a drawbar with
his foot while the car was in motion and that he was warned
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of the bad practice and advised against it. In response· to
the warning, Mr. McGowan merely "looked at him and
grinned" (R. 84, 85). All of the foregoing evidence was
excluded and was never presented to the jury. Certainly, if
such evidence was competent and material, the court's ruing excluding it was prejudicial.
The defendant contends that the rejected evidence was
material to show that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence
which was the sole proximate cause of the injury complained
of.
We may assume, for the moment, that the plaintiff
proved as matter of law a violation of Section 2 of the
Safety Appliance Act. There would still remain for determination by the jury the question whether such violation contributed to the injury or whether the injury was
caused solely by the negligence of the plaintiff. That the
assumed violation of Act did not as a matter of law contribute to the injury is established by two recent decisions of
this Court and the authorities therein cited.
See:

Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., . . . Utah ... ,

~23

P. (2d) 819;

Wilson v. Union Pac. R. Co., ... Utah ... , 231
P. (2d) 715.

In the Coray case, the violation of the Safety Appliance
Act was conclusively established, and in the Wilson case
it was assumed in considering whether the violation contributed to the injury as a matter of law. Here the most
that the plaintiff can claim is that it was for the jury to
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determine whether the defendant violated the Act. It follows that since it was for the jury to determine whether
there was a violation of the Act and whether such violation
if it existed contributed to the injury, there was open to
the defendant the defense that negligence of the plaintiff
was the sole cause of the injury. In this posture of the
case any evidence tending to show that plaintiff was guilty
of negligence which was the sole cause of the injury was
admissible.
It is true that the defendant was permitted to show
that plaintiff went between the cars while one of them was
in motion. We concede that the jury could properly have
determined from the evidence admitted by the court that
plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence was the sole
cause of the injury. But the rejected evidence would have
demonstrated the plaintiff's negligence as a matter of law.
It would have established that the defendant had expressly
directed the plaintiff not to go between moving cars for
any purpose, that the plaintiff had notice of this instruction and of the danger attending its violation; that, notwithstanding this express direction and warning, the plaintiff deliberately disobeyed the instructions and exposed
himself to danger which he fully understood and appreciated.

The rejected rules contain a specific direction to all
employees, including the plaintiff, not to go between moving cars for any purpose. The rejected testimony would
have shown that the plaintiff knew and understood the
contents and the meaning of this rule. The rejected testi-
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mony of the conductor would have established a direct
warning to the plaintiff of the danger of going between
moving cars. In other words, it would have established
the plaintiff's negligence as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court of the United States has. consistently held that the violation by a railroad employee of a
specific order or rule of conduct of which he has knowledge
and understands constitutes negligence on his part which
precludes recovery for an injury proximately caused by
such violation.
See:

Southern Ry. Ca. v. Youngblood, 286 U. S. 313,
52 S. Ct. 518;
Southern Ry. Co. v. Dantzler, 286 U. S. 3·18, 52
S. Ct. 5·20;
Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Wilds, 240 U. S.
444, 36 S. Ct. 406;
Frese v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 263 U. S. 1, 44
S. Ct. 1;
Unadilla Valley R. R. Co. v. Caldine, 278 U. S.
139, 49 S. Ct. 91.
See also:

Vandeveer v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 84 F.
(2d) 979.
This question before us was considered in Boghich v.
Louisville & N. R. Company, 26 Fed. (2d) 361. In that
case the engineer on defendant's train had been killed when
his engine ran into a passenger train at a crossing. The
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operating rules of the Company provided that trains should
come to a full stop before going on to a crossing such as
the one involved in the accident. The deceased's widow
brought the case under the Boiler Inspection Act, alleging
failure of the defendant railroad to have a proper headlight
on the train which her husband was operating. The evidence conclusively showed that this headlight was defective.
Under the Boiler Inspection Act contributory negligence
is not a defense. The trial court permitted the railroad
to introduce evidence, over the plaintiff's objection, of the
failure of the deceased to stop his train before going on
to the crossing, which failure was a violation of the operating rules of the Company. The plaintiff's objection was
based upon the reasoning that contributory negligence is
not a defense in such cases. This Circuit Court, however.
sustained the trial court's ruling, admitting this evidence
and said:
"It is not sufficient to merely show a violation
of the Safety Appliance Acts to support a recovery.
That violation must be the proximate cause of the
injury; and the contributing negligence of the injured employee may be so great as to bar recovery."
In Kern v. Payne, Dir. Gen., 6.5 Mont. 325, 211 P. 767,
suit was brought by the administrator for the death of a
railroad employee who was killed when he went between
two cars to open knuckles of a defective coupler. In doing
so he violated the safety rules of the company. The Supreme
Court of Montana, in reversing a judgment for the administrator, said:
"If it were assumed, in this case, that the decedent knew of the defective knuckle, and knew that
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the knuckle on the moving car was closed, we then
have a situation where the deceased, knowing all of
the circumstances, and with no necessity requiring
him so to do, and with ample time and space in which
to act, willfully and deliberately violates a rule of
the company governing his conduct, and by his own
carelessness and negligence brings about his own
injury.
"We recommend that the judgment and order
be reversed, and the cause remanded to the district
court of Custer county, with directions to dismiss
the complaint."
The Montana court quoted as authority for its position
Thornton's Federal Employees' Liability Act and Safety
Appliance Acts (3rd Ed.), page 469, wherein the author
states:
"In order to enable an employee to recover when
he has been injured by a car not properly equipped
with automatic couplers, such improper equipment
or the absence of an automatic coupler must have
been the proximate cause of his injury, and he has
the burden to show that such was the fact."
In Wilson v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., cited above, this
Court held that "sole causation may include contributory
negligence as the greater includes the lesser". In determining the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries, his conduct
and the surrounding circumstances of that conduct are
proper subjects of inquiry. His understanding and appreciation of the dangers involved in going between the cars
are important in determining whether he acted negligently.
His intentional and deliberate violation of the rules of the
defendant designed to prevent accidents and the specific
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instructions of the defendant preclude his recovery if they
were the sole cause of the injury. The rejection by the
court of this competent and material evidence deprived
the defendant of a vital element of its defense.

SUMMARY
In conclusion, the defendant respectfully submits that
no evidence was offered or received which tended to prove
that the coupling mechanism on the cars involved failed
in any particular to meet the full requirements of the statute; that, on the contrary, the coupling equipment demonstrated by functioning perfectly on the occasion in which
plaintiff was injured that it complied fully with the requirements of the statute; that the trial court in its instructions committed prejudicial error consisting of an
entirely unwarranted interpretation of the statute and in
effect directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and
in rejecting competent and material evidence which prevented the defendant from having a fair trial; and that
the judgment should be reversed with directions to the
trial court to dismiss the action.
Respectfully submitted,
W. Q. VANCOTT,
GRANT H. BAGLEY,
S. N. CORNWALL,
DENNIS McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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